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Abstract 
Prevalent organizational structures used to deter security deviance may limit organizational action to 
mitigate threats, particularly if the threats are novel. We contrast two archetypal personae: the 
Organization Man (Whyte 1956) and the Innovator (Levi-Strauss 1966) to understand behavior in 
security-sensitive situations to provide a novel direction for information security research. This paper 
develops a theoretical foundation to posit that both the Organization Man and the Innovator are 
necessary for secure Information Systems. Moreover, they serve unique and disjoint perspectives to 
develop new understanding of employee behavior regarding information security in organizations. 
Understanding the characteristics of these archetypal personae in security-related situations can improve 
our current understanding of individuals’ security-related behaviors in organizations. 
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Introduction 
Information system (IS) security issues are costly to organizations. The Computer Security Institute (CSI) 
reports that, on average, organizations lose more than $200,000 annually to security breaches 
(Richardson 2009; Richardson 2011). Thus, preventing and responding to security breaches is a crucial 
endeavor in the workplace. Behavioral information security research explains why employees engage in 
deviant security-related acts, how to deter these deviant behaviors, and how employees can be used as 
security assets. However, the role of employees and their behavior regarding information security in 
organizations remains an active and unsettled area of research. Some security studies suggest employees 
may be a major cause for security problems (Warkentin and Willison 2009; Workman and Gathegi 2007). 
However, studies also suggest that employees can be great security assets (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Thus, 
there is some ambiguity in the guidance that research provides regarding employee behaviors and their 
impact on information security in an organization. This motivates the need for different theoretical 
perspectives to inform and guide security research regarding employee behavior and behavioral impacts 
on information security in organizations.  
This research attempts to develop an understanding of employees’ security-related behaviors by studying 
how well-studied archetypal personae explain security behavior. Despite multiple research studies on 
organizational security and employee behavior, information security research has adopted few guiding 
archetypes (Rosenfeld et al. 2007). Archetypes are useful in guiding research in academic disciplines (Xue 
et al. 2008). We argue that the prevalent prescriptive organizational structures for deterring security-
related deviance in employees may limit organizational action to mitigate threats, particularly with regard 
to novel and emergent security threats. Specifically, we contrast two archetypal personae: the 
Organization Man (Whyte 1956) and the Innovator—the Bricoleur and Engineer (Levi-Strauss 1966). 
Archetypes tend to be broad, general, and encompassing; therefore, models that rely on the archetypes in 
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this paper may result in more parsimonious models. Although archetypes may not capture nuance, they 
do represent general patterns in a simple manner. The archetypes presented in this paper provide a basis 
to understand individuals’ behavior in security-sensitive organizational situations and provide a 
foundation for future security research.  
This paper develops novel theoretical foundations to posit that both the Organization Man and the 
Innovator are necessary to ensure secure IS. Moreover, they serve unique and disjoint perspectives to 
develop new understanding of employee behavior regarding information security in organizations. 
However, organizations are established to support the Organization Man. Thus, the Innovator may be 
viewed as deviant or a threat. We seek to alter these perceptions by identifying the important role the 
Innovator plays in information security settings. Understanding the characteristics of these archetypal 
personae in security-related situations can improve our current understanding of individuals’ security-
related behaviors in organizations. This paper proposes a series of security-related propositions to 
develop deep understanding about the role of these archetypes in organizations and better understand the 
implications of our theoretical contribution. In addition, we describe our on-going case-based approach 
and discuss how this informs new avenues of investigation for individuals’ information security related 
behaviors in organizations.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, an understanding of the Organization Man and 
the Innovator archetypes are offered. Second, a discussion of the ability of the Organization Man and the 
Innovator to comply with security policy, identify security vulnerabilities, and respond to security 
breaches is given. Third, a research design is proposed to test the assertions made in this paper. Lastly, 
implications for using the archetypes presented in this paper are shared.  
Background 
Conceptually, we develop the characteristics of the Organization Man and the Innovator in relation to 
compliance with security policies, identification of security vulnerabilities in Information Systems, and 
development of responses to security breaches. The Organizational Man and Innovator archetypes offer 
contrasting approaches and positions to these pervasive organizational information security issues. 
Moreover, an understanding of these archetypes and subsequent consideration of organizational 
information security issues from the perspectives of these archetypes sensitize new ways of seeing (Burke 
1965). We develop these analytic perspectives to provide theoretically informed bases for novel 
conceptualizations, analysis and interpretations.  
The Organization Man 
The Organization Man is a follower and essential driving force of the modern organization (Whyte 1956). 
The Organization Man is bound by the Social Ethic created to sustain the modern organization. 
Importantly, scientism is a foundational principle of the Social Ethic. Whyte (1956) describes scientism in 
the Social Ethic as the pursuit of the “science of man.” The goal of scientism in the Social Ethic is to find 
ways to conform the behaviors of the Organization Man to the goals of the organization. Whyte (1956) 
suggests that educational institutions, governments, communities, and organizations themselves help to 
reify the role of the Organization Man.  
The actions of the Organization Man are constrained by organizational structures, work routines, and 
policies created to maintain the Social Ethic. Examples of these constraints include organizational 
hierarchies, protocols, and policies. These bureaucratic controls are currently the culturally dominant 
form of organizational control (Cardinal, 2001) and security-related governance. Subscribing to the Social 
Ethic, the Organization Man submits to working within the bounds of these constraints, sometimes 
unknowingly. Importantly, the Innovator, particularly the Engineer, may be the source of the controls by 
which the Organization Man is bound (French, 1967). Organizations are established to encourage the 
loyalty and compliance of the Organization Man. 
The Innovator 
As considered here, the Innovator is an amalgam of two archetypes described by Levi-Strauss (1966)—the 
Engineer and the Bricoleur. While they are both innovators, the Engineer and the Bricoleur rely on 
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different means to achieve innovation. The Engineer uses the scientific method to create innovative 
artifacts. The Bricoleur, on the other hand, generates innovation by combining available resources to 
create new resources in an ad-hoc manner. The Engineer, therefore, considers resources beyond their 
immediate reach to create something novel, while the Bricoleur is bound by his immediate environment 
(Levi-Strauss 1966). Importantly, the Innovator tends to think of the greater good based on individual and 
social contributions, making the Innovator less reliant on organizational structure and policy (French 
1967). 
Levi-Strauss (1966) refers to the Bricoleur’s methods of generating knowledge and innovation as a 
“savage” mindset. However, he does not suggest that the Bricoleur’s methods are inferior to the 
Engineer’s. He claims that the term “savage mind” is arbitrary and useful only to present the dichotomy 
between the Engineer and Bricoleur. Both the methods of the Bricoleur and Engineer have strengths and 
weaknesses. For example, the mindset of the Bricoleur is useful in emergency situations where ad hoc, 
resourceful thinking is required to handle the novelty and uncertainty of emergent conditions (Kroll-
Smith et al. 2007). The Engineer’s mindset, on the other hand, is useful for establishing reliability and 
predictability. Similarly, the Engineer’s process is far more considerate, and therefore, less efficient. The 
Bricoleur’s process, however, is resourceful and adaptable, making it more efficient. We consider an 
amalgam of these archetypes since we focus on the innovative output, not considering for the time being, 
the method by which the innovation is achieved.  
Conceptual Development 
Organizational Strain and Archetypal Adoption 
The Organization Man and the Innovator are not static organizational agents. Instead the Organization 
Man and the Innovator represent personae that employees may assume at different times as needed by 
the organizational situation. However, this paper also acknowledges that employees are likely to adopt a 
more permanent persona based on personal traits, roles, and external pressures. For example, employees 
with high levels of commitment are more likely to adopt the persona of the Organization Man (Randall 
1987). Similarly, because of work roles, managers tend to assume the persona of the Organization Man, 
while employees in research and development positions tend to adopt a persona more like the Innovator 
(French 1967). In general, organizational structure, pressures to work efficiently, and other normative 
pressures lead most employees to adopt a persona more like the Organization Man (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Randall 1987). 
Further, organizational actions are guided by an aspiration level — an expected level of organizational 
performance (Cyert and March 1963). In normal operating conditions, employees tend to follow a routine 
and are more risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; March 1997). Routine and controllability are 
important values in the Social Ethic, as they help to control the Organization Man. Therefore, when 
organizations are under little or no duress, employees are more likely to allow structures, roles, and 
norms to guide their actions. 
Merton’s (1938) strain theory suggests that individuals unable to attain societally desirable goals through 
legitimate means may seek to attain the goals through non-routine means. The Innovator often tends to 
be stifled by organizational structure and policy and seems more likely to emerge when an organization 
experiences strain. When organizations experience strain that causes performance to drop below 
aspirations and expectations, employees may be less risk averse and more likely to seek alternative ways 
of thinking or acting to restore performance to aspired levels (Lehman and Ramanujam 2009; March 
1991). This tendency towards alternative innovative thinking is reflected in the Innovator, particularly the 
Bricoleur. The Bricoleur thrives in emergent, strenuous conditions (Kroll-Smith et al. 2007). It is 
reasonable that when faced with significant and novel security threats, organizational performance is 
below its aspiration level. In summary, we propose: 
Proposition 1a: Under normal operating conditions, employees will be more likely to assume the 
persona of the Organization Man than the Innovator. 
Proposition 1b: Under the threat of large, novel security threats, employees will be more likely 
to assume the persona of the Innovator than under normal operating conditions. 
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It is important to note that Proposition 1b does not imply that the Innovator will be the dominant persona 
under strenuous conditions. Organizational structures and external regulation may discourage alternative 
thinking, even when organizations are strained (Lehman and Ramanujam 2009). Thus, the Organization 
Man may be the dominant mindset under all conditions. 
Complying with Security Policy 
The Organization Man is dedicated to policy and protocol. SETA programs (Security education training 
and awareness) are commonly used to influence security-related behaviors of employees. Organizational 
and social structures pressure employees to adopt the persona of the Organization Man (Whyte 1956). 
While the Organization Man is a policy follower, the Innovator looks beyond extant policy, protocol, and 
structure, perhaps to create new policy (French 1967). Therefore, the Innovator may be less likely to 
comply with policy than the Organization Man. The Innovator seeks novel and better ways of operating. 
Thus, the Innovator may view policy as an impediment to progress, and be more likely to ignore policy to 
pursue better operating procedures. Still, the Innovator is likely to receive greater pressure to comply with 
policy under normal organizational conditions than in emergent conditions. Under normal conditions, the 
Innovator is more likely to assume the persona of the methodic, process oriented Engineer than that of 
the Bricoleur. 
Organizational strain creates an environment suited for the Innovator, particularly for the Bricoleur. The 
Bricoleur thrives in emergent, strenuous conditions (Kroll-Smith et al. 2007). In emergencies, the 
resourcefulness of the Bricoleur is useful for handling difficult situations. However, under duress, the 
persona of the Bricoleur may disregard norms, policies, or even laws (Kroll-Smith et al. 2007). Thus, we 
propose the following propositions: 
Proposition 2a: Under normal operating conditions, the Innovator will be less likely to comply 
with security policy than the Organization Man. 
Proposition 2b: Under the threat of large, novel security problems, the gap in policy compliance 
between the Organization Man and the Innovator will be greater than the gap under normal 
conditions. 
Figure 1 presents the gap in compliance that may exist between the Innovator and the Organization Man 
under normal and strenuous conditions. 
 
 
Figure 1. Likelihood of Policy Compliance under normal and straining conditions 
Identifying Security Vulnerabilities 
The Innovator is an experimenter and tinkerer. In methodically testing IS or tinkering with new ways of 
using IS in the absence of a security breach, the Innovator may advertently or inadvertently discover 
security vulnerabilities. For example, security professionals often intentionally test vulnerabilities in 
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organizational information systems in new ways to discover unknown weaknesses. Others in the 
organization who adopt the persona of the Innovator may also be very useful in discovering security 
vulnerabilities. Employees who tinker with systems in novel ways may inadvertently discover 
vulnerabilities that lead to more secure IS. The Organization Man, on the other hand, is likely to use IS 
only as suggested by policy and for routine purposes, and therefore, less likely to find security 
vulnerabilities in the organizational information systems.  
The Organization Man is a follower of routine, and is very likely to notice deviations in procedure. 
Security breaches that disrupt routine procedures are likely to be noticed quickly by an employee 
following the Organization Man archetype. For example, an accountant following daily routine is likely to 
identify a discrepancy between recorded and actual cash flows in sales caused by a security breach. 
Similarly, a security professional could identify unwanted traffic in an IS through routine system 
monitoring. The Innovator, however, is not tied to routine. Always tinkering or experimenting, the 
Innovator is less likely to notice deviations from routine since there is no consistent routine to disrupt.  
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 3a: In the absence of a security breach, the Innovator will be more likely to identify 
security vulnerabilities in an IS than the Organization Man. 
Proposition 3b: In the presence of a security breach, the Organization Man will be more likely to 
identify security vulnerabilities in an IS than the Innovator. 
Figure 2 presents reversal that occurs in the ability of the Organization Man and the Innovator to identify 
security vulnerabilities under different breach conditions. 
●
Innovator
●
Organization Man 
Lower Identification Higher Identification
Identifying Security Vulnerabilities in absence of a Breach
 
●
Organization Man
●
Innovator 
Lower Identification Higher Identification
Identifying Security Vulnerabilities in Presence of a Breach
 
Figure 2. Likelihood of identifying security vulnerabilities under breach and non-breach 
conditions 
Responding to Security Breaches 
Organizations develop Incident Response Plans (IRP) to prepare for security breaches. An IRP describes 
known security threats, people to contact if the breach occurs, as well as procedures that constitute 
appropriate response to the breach (Staggs 2009). This formulaic plan is useful for guiding the actions of 
the Organization Man. When a known breach occurs, the Organization Man is likely to follow protocol 
prescribed by the IRP to resolve the security issue. Therefore, the Organization Man will respond quickly 
to known security threats to the extent that the organization has developed an effective IRP and has 
adequately trained employees to use it. The Innovator, however, may be more likely to ignore policy and 
protocol to find an alternate solution. Solutions developed by the Innovator may require more time and 
effort to develop than rote responses. Similarly, any response developed by the Innovator in a short period 
of time could result in failure or be less effective than planned responses.  
The persona of the Innovator thrives in emergent situations, while the persona of the Organization Man 
relies on procedure to respond to situations, including novel situations. The Organization Man, therefore, 
is unlikely to respond well to novel security threats. Controls and governance mechanisms, such as IRPs, 
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exist for known threats. Unfortunately, just as technology is ever evolving, so are IS security threats. 
Procedures cannot be created for a breach until an organization has experienced it, or otherwise considers 
it. The Innovator, particularly the Bricoleur, is responsive and reactive to novel situations. The Innovator 
could, therefore, devise novel responses more quickly. Although the solutions are not guaranteed to work, 
the response of the Innovator may be more effective than no response. Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 4a: Under the threat of a familiar security breach covered by an existing Incident 
Response Plan, the Organization Man is more likely to respond quickly and suitably to the 
threat than the Innovator. 
Proposition 4b: Under the threat of a large, novel security breach, the Innovator is better 
equipped to respond more quickly and suitably to the threat than the Organization Man. 
Figure 3 presents reversal that occurs in the ability of the Organization Man and the Innovator to respond 
to security threats under different breach conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Ability to respond to familiar and novel security threats 
Research Design and Case Study 
The archetypes described in this paper are novel considerations in security research. Thus, research has 
not validated their existence in the security context. In this section, we introduce The Tower as an 
organizational case context to describe the manifestation and importance of the archetypes of the 
Organization Man and the Innovator using the propositions we have developed. The case study was 
conducted over a 12 month period when structural changes were being implemented at the case 
organization. All interviews were recorded and undertaken in the tradition of Waltham’s (1993) 
interpretive research design. Space limitations forbid us from presenting the pros and cons of case study 
work. Interpretive research designs are however well accepted in the literature and we strictly followed 
the tenants in conducting the case study.  
The Tower – An Illustrative Case 
The Tower is a major hotel and casino property located in a thriving tourist location in the US. Security is 
an important aspect to ensure smooth operations. Security at the Tower is provided by two departments, 
Gaming Surveillance and General Physical Security, each with its own management. Management in 
security has been in place since a 1995 expansion and change of ownership.  
Strain at the Tower 
Since the expansion, the IT manager has often stated that he feels the present security management is 
ineffective and they should not be an independent department. Security management has felt that IT has 
interfered with the operation and confidentiality of security investigations. Security Officers felt unnerved 
when, while they were working on a report, IT personnel would take control of the screen. IT would 
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explain that they were correcting problems and needed to test the system. Similar strains between the 
departments at the organization reveal different archetypal behaviors under normal and strained 
conditions.  
Compliance at the tower 
The Security department found itself becoming more and more reliant on Information Technology. The 
CFO set up a committee to investigate compliance in the organization, chaired by the IT Director and with 
representation from each department in the organization. Department representatives reported lower 
levels of compliance, which steadily improved. The increased focus on compliance placed restrictions on 
acquisition and installations of hardware and software in the organization. On the surface this appeared 
to be a logical procedure. However, interestingly, this created additional tensions in the organization.  
Identifying Vulnerabilities at the Tower 
Since the discovery of several viruses on the network, the IT department decided to throw the proverbial 
baby out with the bath water. Instead of implementing competent malware prevention, they decided to 
take the drives out of all network computers. The conceptual model that was held by the Security 
Department was not the same one seen by IT. These needed to be brought together.  Ultimately, the 
mistrust of IT for anyone outside their department led them to remove drives from all the computers on 
the network.  
Responding to Security Breaches at the tower 
The organization implemented a new dispatch system, which took nearly 2 years to become operational. 
Some dispatchers learned several tricks to keep the program up and running. These dispatchers adopted 
out of system behaviors, which may cause security breaches in the long run. Several other dispatchers 
asked for changes of assignment or left the company rather than keep fighting to comply with a faulty 
program. The report-writing module that was going to provide a link among the Officers on the floor, Risk 
Management, and Investigations still gathers dust in the Manager’s office. The only people who bothered 
to learn how it worked, have left the company. 
Discussion 
This paper has identified two archetypes—the Organization Man and the Innovator—to inform future IS 
security research. This paper has suggested that the two archetypal personae react to security situations 
differently. However, the modern organization is structured in a way that primarily encourages the 
adoption of the Organization Man persona and mostly discourages the participation of the Innovator. Yet 
the Innovator has much to add to organizational security. What may appear to be noncompliant behavior 
may be novel approaches to addressing security issues under limited resources. The Organization Man is 
not highly responsive. Thus, it may be in the best interest of organizations to accommodate multiple 
personae. 
Given that the Innovator is discouraged from acting in organizations, this paper suggests that 
organizations should seek to establish structures that allow both the Organization Man and the Innovator 
to thrive. A structure and policies that encourage employees to adopt the persona of the Organization Man 
in normal conditions and the persona of the Innovator in emergent conditions could benefit the 
organization by relying on the strengths of each persona. 
Organizations that encourage employees to adopt the persona of the Innovator, particularly that of the 
Bricoleur, need to encourage strong ethical guidelines. The Bricoleur tends to disregard policies, rules, 
and norms (Kroll-Smith et al. 2007), particularly in straining situations (Lehman and Ramanujam 2009). 
Therefore, certain values may need to be deeply rooted in employees to avoid unethical or illegal actions. 
These propositions are grounded in strong theoretical foundations that are novel in their application to 
information systems security literature. We have developed the conceptualizations based on strong theory 
and grounded them in our case study to develop propositions that lead to theorizing about information 
security behaviors under a variety of security conditions. 
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Conclusions 
This paper has presented a series of propositions to be tested. This paper, being a work in progress, will 
seek to test these propositions as discussed above. Since these archetypes have never been examined in a 
security setting, researchers should be reluctant to use them before they are tested. 
Archetypes are useful for guiding research in a given field (Xue et al. 2008). The archetypes described in 
this paper should act as a strong foundation for future security research. For example, future research 
might consider how the Organization Man and the Innovator respond to social engineering attacks. It may 
be that the Organization Man is more susceptible to social engineering because social engineers use 
existing social and organization structures to take advantage of victims. Since the Organization Man is 
more likely to adhere to social and organizational norms and structure, those who adopt the persona of 
the Organization Man may be more vulnerable. 
Similarly, the rigid policies and protocols created by the Social Ethic may lead the Organization Man to 
consider only the procedural aspects of security. The mindset of the Organization Man, therefore, may 
focus on rote compliance, but ignore the overall goal of making IS more secure. It could be that the 
Innovator is more focused on the end goal, which could lead to more secure IS. 
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